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MISSING IN ACTION? UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP 
IN THE LAW OF vVAR 
DA VfD GUVIEI( 
One of the rnost strikrng developments m international Jaw 
over the last thirty years has been An1erica's effective abdication of 
the Jesding role il had plc:1yed in tht.: tldvancentenl of law of vvar 
codification and application during the first 200 years of its history. 
While the United States hc1s ratified several fairly non-con troversial 
treaties in lhe last three decades, i t  has r·efuscd to join, and even 
worked to undermine the impl ementat io n  of, other agreements 
lhat enjoyed broad jnternalioncll support. Furthermore, for 
probably the first time in its hislory, the United States sought to 
avoid the application of rules to itself that it had previously 
faithfully observed even in conflicts with adversaries who did not 
reciprocate. 
To understand how exceptional American behavior has been in 
this recent period., one needs to appreciate its leading role in this 
field in earlier days. Dating back to the Arnerican Revolution, the 
United States was an early proponent oi conducting hostilities in 
faithful adherence to the rule of law and civilized values, including 
early recognition of the right to surrender and commitment to 
humane treatment of captured enemies. Both Congress and 
George Washjngton agreed on the wisdom of this approach, which 
both encouraged enemy surrender, and earned public support for 
the American war effort, even while Americans were ty pically 
treated quite harshly by their British adversary . 
Following its victory in the Revolution, the United States took a 
leading role in advancing (urther development of the law, 
including protections for prisoners of war in several bilateral 
treaties that clearly exceeded the customary requirements of the 
lavvs of war as understood in thc:lt e�ge. The United States also 
rejected the pre�ctice of other n?ttions wl-w subjected spjes to 
su nunary execution; in 1776 Congress made them stcllutorily liable 
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to trial by court-martic1l using language the�t is still recogruzable in 
the modern Uniform Code of Milit,uy Justice. 
The United Stales made even more substantial contributions to 
the l<1w of war during its 1846-48 conflict with Mexico. Adopting 
policies tn rgeted at gaining popult�r Mexican .Kquiescence to the 
presence of his r�rn1y in their country) Genera i \'\Iinfie ld Scott 
insisted his men respect civilian property and the Catholic Church, 
pr�y fr�ir value for all provisions received from local sources, and 
protect the local populace against predations frorn bandits. 
Because there was no leg21l basis for extending U.S. criminilllaw to 
Mexic<:ut tt�rritury, Scutt prumulgated rules regulating the conduct 
of both Americans cm.d Mexica.ns in the form of <.1 martial law 
orcler, which he then evenhandedly enforced, trying violators 
before military commissions which he had cre<1ted expressly for 
this purpose. Departing from the European military prC�ctice of 
summarily executing guerillas and other u_nprivilt·ged com batants, 
and going beyond the congressional mcmdate for spy tria ls, Scott 
also insisted on conducting trials for these individuals as well, 
employing a separate tribunal which he called "councils of war" 
(this role was subsumed by the military commission in subsequent 
conflicts).1 Via a series of intervening historical steps, the U.S. 
conduct in Mexico eventua.lly formed the basis of what h21s become 
codified in. international law as the law of belligerent occupation.2 
The Arncrican Civil War savv the drafting of the seminal effort 
in the ove1rall development of the modern law of war, through the 
Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States 
in the Field. Better known as the "Lieber Code" after its primary 
c?\uthor, Columbia University professor Francis Lieber, this vvork 
was the first serious c:�ttempt to capture the full scope of the 
customary la w of war in a form. suitnble to guide the conduct of 
soldiers in the field. Il responded to a need cretltcd by the Jack of 
professionnl knowledge on the part of the thousands of 
inexperienced volunteer officers drc1wn from civilian pursuits and 
1 Sec . ..:. •� .• Haridimos V. Thravalos, The lvlilitanf CulllllliS:'>iun i11 lhl! War vn 
rcrroriSIIT, st ViLL. L. H.[\'. 737, 74·!-46 (1006) (dt:'SCril;in� "councils of \VC1r'' under 
CL'Ih:•ra! Scott). 
2 Sec Oi;�vid Glazier, lglllmlf/cc /:;No/ 8/i:;s: Tlu: Law Ctj6cllis..:rcut Occupntin11 nud 
tile U.S. IIII'c;•sioll ��r lmq, 58 RlirCt:f{S L. RFV. 121. 146, 139-73 (2005) ("While the 
underlying causes of Napt)le<m's difficultie!:; in Spain will be set:n lobe the subject 
of specific provisions in the modern law, specific measures taken by the 
Americans in Mexico will be seen to now generally be the actual mle.") (emphasis 
;�ddcd). 
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placed in positions of responsibility in the wpidlv expanded Union 
Army. It Wi'IS cl petrticularly significant reflection of the AmeriCcln 
cornmitrncnt to the law of wm given lhCil the Union was not 
ob ligated to follow inlernettional rules in dealing w.ith an internc:ll 
rebellion, vet chose to do so never thele ss. The Lieber Code was 
subsequently adopted in large measure by a nun.1ber of European 
r�rmies, and is directly acknowledged ,1s the basis for subsequen t  
lJw of Wclr codifications, inclL1d ing the Hi1gue Regulations 
Respecting lhc Laws and Custorns of War on Land which remc1in 
vc1lid lc1w tu this dav. Tbe United States' controversial 1865 
J 
prosecution oi Henry Wirz, commandant of the notorious 
Andersonville prisoner of vvar camp, was perh.CJps the firsl modern 
"war crimes" trial. 
Over the rcmCJindcr of the nineteenth century the United States 
continued to refine the law of war. AI though tile conduct of its 
wars vvith Native Americc:m s was marred by a number of egregious 
inci dents, the Army did come to recognize Indian adversaries as 
lawful bellige rents and C1ccord lhcm immmtity from civilian 
prosecution for acts cond uctecl during hostilities. The Philippine 
Insurrection following the SpEmish-American Wm saw further 
development of U.S. law of war princip les, including efforts to 
hold American commanders responsible for unlawful acts 
comm it ted by subordinates under the principle of comriland 
responsibility. 
Contin uing Cit the forefront of l aw of \-Var adherence, the United 
States r21tified almost all of the treaties on this subject that entered 
into force in the first half of the twentieth century, and pJayed thE" 
leading role in. establish ing the first systematic effort at leg<1.l 
a ccountabil ity for Wi'lr crimes in lhe wake of World War ll. 
Americans vvere instrumental in establishing and cond ucting the 
top-le vel lnterni'ltional Mi litary Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo 
wh ile U.S. national tribunals tried more than 3,000 ndditional Axis 
defendnnts around the world. 
The Urtited States was an active participCJnt in the diplomatic 
conference thCit negotioted the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which it 
re:1 tif ied after the conclusion of the Korean War. Despite popular 
portrayals tu the contrary by anti-war activists; <md u few well­
public ized incidents like the My Lai massacr�1 the United States 
generally strove to comply with law of war mandates in Vietnam , 
CMefully restricting aerial tmgeting of the North1 for example. U.S. 
forces even accorded indigenous Viet Cong fighters prisoner-of-
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war status although those fighters had no formal entitlen1cnt to it 
as internal adversaries of the South Vietnamese government. 
As a result of concern about the effects of some U.S. actions 
during the war, including efforts at cloud-seeding and extensive 
use of defoliants, the Senate took the lead in directing the 
governn1ent to negotiate vvhat becan1e the 1976 U.N. Convention 
on the Prol>..ibition of Environn1ental Modification Techniques. 
1ndeed, the United States participated actively in developing the 
law of war through the end of the 1970s. In 1975 it ratified the 1925 
Geneva Protocol b;:mning the use of poison gases, and it took an 
active role in the negotiations that culminated in the adoption of 
two additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977, 
signing the agreements on the first day it was possible to do so. 
Additional Protocol l (" AP I") expanded the Geneva 
Convention coverage of international armed conflict, adding some 
rules for the actual conduct of hostilities to the conventions' focus 
on protecting persons never or no longer involved in combat and 
explicitly codified some important provisions previously found 
only in customary rules. It is undoubtedly one of the most 
significant developments in the law of war in the sixty years since 
the Geneva Conventions were adopted. Add itional Protocol II 
(" AP II") was less substantial, but did expand the scope of 
protections provided to participants in non-international armed 
conflicts, which previousiy had been addressed in only the single 
Common Article 3 found in all four of the 1949 treaties. 
The 1980s, hovvever, saw the United States change course and 
begin to abrogate its historic leadership role. Although the U.S. 
military and State Department participated in the additional 
protocol negotiations and initially supported ratification, the 
Reagan Adn•inistration adopted the critical arguments against API 
raised by some conservatives, including Douglas Feith,:> who 
would later play a key role in justifying the 2003 invasion of Iraq as 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. In 1987 President Reagan 
submitted AP 11 to the Senate for advice and consent to its 
ratification, but his letter of transmittal declared that "Protocol 1 is 
3 St:c George H. Aldrich, Prospect� for United Stotes Ratification of 1\dditionn/ 
PnJtocol i to the 194:9 Ge•lt?Pr1 Co��t�entio11s, 85 AM J lNT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1991) ("The 
decision by the Reagan ad ministration to reject Protocol l vvas foreshadO\·ved by a 
series of individual writings from 1984 to 1986 asserting that the Protocol served 
the interests of terrorists. . . . One polemicist Douglas J. Feith, then a Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, even described the negotiations as a 'sinister and 
sad tale' and a' prostitution of the law."'). 
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fundamentally and irreconcilably flcn·ved" and that it would not be 
ratified by the United States:1 Tbl' letter identified two specific 
flavvs with the treaty; its treatment of "w<rrs of national liberation" 
as interncltional armed conflicts .:�nd its grMlt of con1batant status to 
some irregular forces wbich the letter cqut1tcd to "terrorists."� The 
letter also says that "the joint Chiefs of Staff have also concluded 
that a number of the provisions of the Protocol are nulitarily 
unaccept<�ble''t• despite the fact the1t the military had no issue at the 
tinle of signature. One of these concerns �ovvs separately identified 
as being that API is "to(> ambiguous and complicated to use as a 
practical guide for milit<lrv opcrc1lions.":' 
The President did promise that the United States would work 
with its allies to find ways to adopt "the positive provisions of 
Protocol I tha,l could be of real hunwnitari<m benefit''� including 
their potential application as customary intern21tional law. Despite 
an initial modest flurry of activity in this regard, jnclucling 
identification by some administration officials of parts of AP l that 
might constitute customary ldw, ultimately nothing definitive has 
ever come of these efforts. l'he authoritative law of war manual 
issued to the U.S. Army today, Field Manual 27--JO, ') dates from 
1956, having been published the year after the United States 
ratified the 1949 Conventions. It thus provides U.S. forces in the 
field absolutely no guidance whatsoever as to which provisions of 
the Additional Protocols m.ight be considered binding upon the 
United States (nor any information on rules contained in the 
4 Letter of Ronald Reagan, President, United States, to United States 
Congress (Jan. 29, 1987), rl!prilltcd i11 81 AM. j. l'\!T'L L. 910. 911 (1987) [hereinafter 
L�ller ofT ransn1ittal]. 
5 fd. The concem about irn�bular:;j terrorists \Vel� b.:l::;ed on a flawed reading 
of Article 44. That ilrticle spcLifically refers bc�ck to tlw pn•vious article for the 
dettnltion of combatant, and Article 43 requires cMnbatants to be L1nder a 
comm<1nd responsible to a state pMty, subject tn an inlern:1l discipline system 
enforcing compliance with the hw: o� war. Cleilrly these critcrin rule our Article 
4-± providing protl.!ction for terrorists. 
" Jd. 
' Aldrich, sTtptll note 3, ,1t 11 (quoting Letter tlf Submitt.1l from Secretary of 
State Georg� rJ. Shultz, S. TRE,\ I"Y 01)<.. No.2, 100th Congress, ·t:,t scss., VII, IX) . 
. � Letter of Trnnsmi tt:ll, Sllpm note -1, at •:Yl 1. 
" LJ.S. Dr.:r'T Oi· rl-lE A1�.vn, f!Ein M.\'.iUt\1. 27-JO, TrrE LAw uF LAND WARFARE 
(1956). The manual also conlilins il single thret?-page change inserted in 1976, 
providing guidance on lhe Geneva Gas Protocol adopted the previous year. See 
id. appendix A-ii ("Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other 
gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly 
condenmed by the general opinion of the civilized world .... "). 
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various law of war treaties enacted subsequently, even where the 
United States is a treaty party). Meanwhile 168 other nations, 
including virtually all actual U.S. military allies1o except NATO 
partner Turkey, have ratified API. The United Kingdom does not 
seem� to have found the Protocol to be a significant problem� while 
fighting alongside the United States in several recent conflicts. Its 
current military mam.-taC11 probably the most coherent and 
comprehensive document on the law of war currently available, 
has no apparent difficulty explaining AP l's rules. Nleanwhile, the 
U.S. Senate has never even consented to the ratification of AP II; it 
is i�nexplicably still awaiting action twenty-two years after 
President Eeagan's request for its approvaL 
On a more positive note, the United States is one of 186. 
countries which joined the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, 
con1ntitting itself to destroy all existing stocks. The United States is 
also party to the umbrella U.N. Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons ("CCW") adopted in 1980, as well as its 
more specific protocols placing restrictions on weapons producing 
non-detectable fragments ("Protocol I"), mines and booby-traps 
("Protocol I "), incendiary weapons ("Protocol TH"), blinding laser 
weapons ("Protocol IV"), and explosive remnants of war 
("Protocol V"). 
This latter issue has received considerable global attention in 
the past two decades, with growing public awareness of the 
casualties certain weapons, particularly landmines and cluster 
munitions, have inflicted on innocent civilians years after previous 
armed conflicts have ended. Popular concen1, mobilized in part by 
the personal efforts of individuals and non-governmental 
organizations, especially the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines, headed by Jodie Williams, led to the adoption of the 
1997 Ottawa Convention barring the use of anti-personnel mines 
and requiring the destruction of all existing stocks. The 
Convention now has 156 state parties. But while the United States 
no longer exports mines, and has contributed substantially to 
landmine clearance around the world, it has refused to join this 
IO lsrael, which is often incorrectly cited as a U.S. e1l!y in popular n>edia, he1s 
e1lso refused to ratify API. Although the United States is clearly Israel's leading 
supporter in the world community, the t\ovo nations ore not party to a JTiutual 
defense agreement and thus are not "allies" in any legal sense. 
11 See gellernlly UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL 0� THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT (2004). 
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treaty, asserting that anti-personnel mines arc essential for the 
defense of Korea, even though the United States has no minefields 
under its control there.u 
Similar concerns have arisen over the issue of cluster 
munitions-bon1bs or artillery shells that dispense a large number 
of smaller explosive charges capable of killing or incapacitating 
personnel and lightly protected vehicles over a large area. A single 
cluster vveapon can typically kill all exposed persormel over an 
area the size of several football fields. The problem with these 
weapons is their initial reliability; a single bomb might contain 
several hundred individual submunitions and in actual use 
between ten and thirty percent typically fail to detonate, leaving 
dozens of lethal remnants that can maim or kill years after a 
conflict has ended. Civilian casualties are still being inflicted by 
remnants of these weapons in Southeast Asia today, more than 
three decades after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross ("fCRC") estimates that 
U.S. cluster bombs' remnants have caused over 10,000 civilian 
casualties just in Laos.B The submunitions dispensed by some 
bombs used by the United States in Afghanistan between 2001 and 
2003 were similar in size and coloration to humanitarian relief 
packets dropped in the same timeframe, making their use even 
more problematic. 
While a plausible argument can be made that cluster munitions 
use should be unlawful under longstanding customary law of war 
principles barring weapons that are indiscriminate in their effects, 
the international response has been focused on bringing them 
within explicit treaty coverage. Originally these efforts were 
coordinated under the aegis of the CCW process, but frustrated 
with U.S. opposition, 111 concerned nations adopted the approach 
taken to ban landmines and met outside this process, agreeing to 
an outright ban, kno-vvn as the Oslo Convention on Cluster 
�� U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: Frequently Asked Questions on the , ew 
United States Landmine Policy (Feb. 27, 2004), http:/ jwww.globalsecurity.org 
jmilit,lry/libraryjnevvsj2004/02jmil-040227-30050pf.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 
2009). 
13 Sec, e.g., Andrew Feickert, Cluster Munition:;: Backgrou11d and Issues, 
CONGRESS COi\!CRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, june 27, 2008, at l, auailnb/e at 
http:/ jwww.fas.org/sgp/crsjweapons/RS22907.pdf ("Cluster munitions were 
used extensively in Southeast Asia by the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (JCRC) estimates that in Laos 
alone, 9 to 27 million unexploded submunitions remained after the conflict 
resulting in over 10,000 civilian casualties to date."). 
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Munitions, in May 2008. The United States is now belatedly trying 
to achieve a less restrictive pact through the CCW process, but not 
surprisingly, few other nations are still interested in participating 
in efforts to regulate a weapon that they have already agreed to 
ban. 
Prosecuting vvar crimes is another area in which the United 
States has largely surrendered its once leading role. Although the 
1.949 Geneva Conventions called upon states to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over grave breaches, the United States waited until 
1996 to enact implementing legislation, the War Crimes Act of 
1996, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2441.. Falling short of the treaties' 
JTtandates, hovvever, the War Crirnes Act limits U.S. jurisdiction to 
cases in which either perpetrator or victim is a U.S. national. A 
longstanding U.S. aspiration to have a standing court able to 
prosecute vvar criminals from around the world came to fruition 
with the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
which has now begun functioning in the Hague. After President 
Bill Clinton signed the treaty just before leaving office, his 
successor, President George W. Bush responded to conservative 
fears that U.S. personnel could somehow be subject to "political" 
prosecutions and deciared that he was "unsigning" the treaty. The 
United States is thus not one of the current 108 state parties. This is 
particularly unfortunate because the Assembly of States Parties to 
the Rome Statute, from which the United States is thus excluded, is 
currently in the process of defining conduct that will constitute the 
crime of aggression. Having both taken the lead in prosecuting 
this offense after World War II, and now using military force more 
often than any other major power, this is an area in which the 
United States should be particularly interested in having a hand in 
developing governing law. 
Despite the plethora of law of war treaties now in force, only 
the four Geneva Conventions have been universally ratified. It 
was thus entirely predictable, particularly given the failure of the 
United States and a ha11dful of other conflict-prone nations to ratify 
AP I, that situations would continue to arise in which custom.ary 
international law of war rules might still govern many aspects of 
anned con.flicts. The ICRC therefore instituted a rn.ulti-year, rt'\ulti­
million dollar project to identify customary rules applicable to both 
international and non-international armed conflict. The resulting 
three-volume study was published in 2005. The U.S. government, 
represented by State Departn1ent Legal Advisor John Bellinger and 
Department of Defense General Counsel William Haynes, drafted 
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a cri,tical response potenti,1l ly characterized RS "hair spl itting," 
objecting in pa rticular to the lCRC's rnethodology in ascertaining 
the state practice necessary to create custcHnary intemationallaw.H 
While .freely criticizing the ICRC's efforts, the U.S. reply made no 
effort to idenl i.fy vvhat specific taws of war rules constitute 
customarY law. 
This failure takes on particulctr signi.ficancc given U.S. conduct 
of the so-called ''war on terror" launched in response to the attacks 
of September 11, 2001. Although widespread support ini tially 
existed for U.S. a uthority to emplov armed force in response to lhe 
attC!cks, including express endorsement by NATO and implicit 
U.N. Secmity Council sanction, the Unill'd States held that botl1 the 
Tal iban and al Qaeda fell outside the SCL1pe of Geneva Coll\rention 
protections.':; It was therefore logic?llly necessary to ground U.S. 
conduct 111 custornarv law of war rules, but the realitv is that while - -
the United States paid periodic lip service to doing so, it essentially 
acted as if in a law-free zone. 
Determ.inabons of vvho could be detained, cond itions of 
con.finement at Guantanamo and olher f<'lcili lies in the United 
StCites and abroad, permissible in.terrogRtion methods, and even 
charges which could be preferred and trial procedure should all 
hCive been determined wjth explicit reference to the law of war. 
But the United States simply declared its c2lpturcd adversaries to 
be "enemy combatants," a term coi ned in the Pentagon which does 
not conform vvith any specific classification recognized by the law 
of war. Essential y the United States just made up rules as it went 
along. Even while insisting it was comm.ilted to "humane" 
treatment, senior U.S. leaders sanctioned conduct ranging from 
sleep deprivation and stress positions to walerboa.rding. What is 
particularly perverse .is that the idea for using many of these 
techniques C<Hne from the U.S. military's Survival, Evasions, 
1·1 Letter from John B. Bcllingt>r, Ill, L�gal Ad\'isnr, U.S. Dep't of State & 
William ]. Haynes, GencrDI Counsel, Dep't of Der.. to Or. Jakob Kellenberger, 
President. IM'I Comm. of the Red Cross (Nov. 3, 200o), avt1ilt1/lle nt 
http:/ 1 W\Vw.defensdink.mil/ hume/ pdf I Customary _lntemc1lional 
_llumi.lniti<Hi.m_Law.pdf. 
15 Sec Mt•monmdum frl>nl Prc.sidc:nt of the Unill!d Stiltes to Vice President of 
the United States, Hurn.411C Trl't1tment uf al Qacda nnd Tnliban DetaincL:S (Feb. 7, 
2002), MmilnLP/e at btlp:j I wvv1v.pegc. us/ nrc-hive/ Whitl'_House/ bush_mem.o 
_20020207 _�d.pdf ("ID]eh.'m1ine that none of the provisions of Geneva apply to 
L1Ur conriict with al Qaeda in Afghanist<m or elsewhere throughoLJt the world 
because, among otht>r reasons, al Qacda is not a I ligh Contracting Party to 
Geneva."). 
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Resistance, and Escape ("SERE") training prov ided to those service 
personJlel considered a t greatest risk of capture, special forces, and 
aviators. Yet the stated SERE mission is to prepare these 
combatants for dealing with the unlawful tret�trnent accorded by 
America's recent unprincipled adversaries. These techniques were 
known to be ineffective a t  obtaining accura te information; the very 
reason they have been employed by U.S. enemies is to obtain fo!sc 
admissions of wrongdoing desired for propagand(l purposes. 
Even where U.S. conduct was most dependent on legal 
COil1[.1 1 iCince - the trial of Guantanamo detainees by mil itary 
commissions- it fell short. Even vvi thou t wllnt e�re widelv 
considered to be significant procedural defects, most law of war 
experts agree that the very charges on which three Guantanamo 
detainees have been convicted, i nc lud ing conspiracy and 
providing n1Citerial support to terroris.m., do not even state 
legi tima te violations of that corpus jttris. 
These departu res from the law of wen- have hud real 
consequences, undermining world public opinion in the U.S. 
conduct of the "war on terror," and m8king fore ign nations 
reluctant to cooperate with the United States. They have also 
furthered the cause of America's adversaries, motivating su pport 
and even recruitment for both terrorist groups and the lragi 
resistance. 
The real i ty is that law of war com.pliance is much more than a 
humanitarian ideal; i t is also a practical tool facili ta ting the overall 
e1chieven1ent of national political objectives, as American pol itical­
military leaders da ting back to George Washington have long 
recognized. l f  the United States is to benefit from complinnce with 
the law of wc:rr, i t  clearly is advantageous for i t  also to take a 
leading role in legal developn1.ent, he lping to sha pe the J a w  to its 
oyeral l  advantage. 
ln hinds igh t, it seems l ikely that the roots of Americc1's extra­
lega l conduct of the "wnr on terror" can be seen in the previous 
three decades' trend towards non-participation in agreements like 
AP l and the fe1ilure to actively define tTlCaning[ul interpretations of 
customary low or provide updated law of war gu idance to U.S. 
grOLmd forces. Tt can only be hoped that this tnmd will be reversed 
in the future and the United States resumes its role as a leading 
force in both the development and implementation of the le1w of 
war. 
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